





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Armstrong, J., & Brigo, D. (2019). Risk managing tail-risk seekers: VaR and expected shortfall vs S-shaped
utility. Journal of Banking and Finance, 101, 122-135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.01.010
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 25. May. 2021
Risk managing tail-risk seekers:
VaR and expected shortfall vs S-shaped utility
Abstract
We consider market players with tail-risk-seeking behaviour modelled by S-
shaped utility, as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky. We argue that
risk measures such as value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) are
ineffective in constraining such players, as such measures cannot reduce the
traders expected S-shaped utilities. Indeed, when designing payoffs aiming
to maximize utility under a VaR or ES risk limit, the players will attain the
same supremum of expected utility with or without VaR or ES limits. By
contrast, we show that risk management constraints based on a second more
conventional concave utility function can reduce the maximum S-shaped util-
ity that can be achieved by the investor. Indeed, product designs leading
to progressively larger S-shaped utilities will lead to progressively lower ex-
pected constraining conventional utilities, violating the related risk limit.
These results hold in a variety of market models, including the Black Scholes
options model, and are particularly relevant for risk managers given the his-
torical role of VaR and the endorsement of ES by the Basel committee in
2012–2013.
Keywords and phrases: Optimal product design under risk constraints;
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value at risk constraints; expected shortfall constraints; concave utility constraints;
S-shaped utility maximization; limited liability investors; tail-risk-seeking investors;
effective risk constraints; concave utility risk constraints.
JEL classification codes: D81, G11, G13.
1. Introduction
We consider the effects of imposing risk constraints on a trader in the case when
that trader exhibits risk-seeking behaviour over losses or has limited liability.
When making investment decisions, a trader is constrained in how much funds
they can use in setting up the investment (giving rise to a budget or price con-
straint). In addition a trader is typically limited on how much risk of future losses
the investment may entail. Risk limits are common in banking and represent a tool
for risk control. A natural risk limit to adopt is a risk limit based on classic risk
measures such as Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). The trader is
then constrained to choose an investment whose VaR or ES is below a given limit,
set by the bank risk manager when approving the trade.
The question we seek to answer in this paper is whether such limits are effective
when the trader exhibits tail-risk-seeking behaviour or has some form of limited
liability. We consider a risk limit to be “effective” if it has an economic impact upon
the trader, in the sense that imposing the limit decreases the expected utilities that
the trader can achieve. We model the tail-risk-seeking behaviour and/or limited
liability by assuming that the utility of the trader is given by an S-shaped function
of the payoff of their investments. We assume that the trader acts to maximize
their expected utility, subject to the budget constraint and any risk constraints. We
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find that in market models including the benchmark Black–Scholes model, neither
VaR nor ES constraints are effective in curbing such risk-seeking behaviour. This
result is particularly important in the light of the fact that ES has been officially
endorsed and suggested as a risk measure by the Basel committee in 2012-2013
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013, 2016), partly for its “coherent
risk measure” properties (Artzner et al., 1999; Acerbi and Tasche, 2002).
The function which determines the utility from the investment payoff is taken
to be S-shaped, in the sense that it is convex on the left and concave on the right.
This may occur for two reasons. We suppose that the trader receives a personal
reward, such as their pay packet, given by some function of the investment payoff.
We also suppose that the trader’s preferences over possible personal gains and
losses are determined by their personal utility function. The trader’s utility as a
function of the investment payoff is then given by the composition of their utility
function and the reward function. The composition may then be S-shaped if either
the trader has an S-shaped personal utility function or the reward function is non-
linear.
If the trader’s utility function is S-shaped, then this models the case of traders
exhibiting a risk-seeking attitude towards losses. S-shaped utility functions were
introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to explain the risk preferences they
observed empirically. Their work provides evidence that a risk manager should
seriously consider the possibility that traders take a risk-seeking attitude towards
losses.
The reward function may be non-linear if, for example, the pay packet of the
trader is proportional to the investment returns in the event that the investments
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make a profit, but is zero if there is a loss, irrespective of the loss made. This is
the case of “limited liability”.
As we shall see, if the trader seeks to maximize their expected utility (given
as an S-shaped function of the payoff) and is subject to no constraints other than
a budget constraint, then, in familiar market models such as the Black–Scholes
options market, such traders will pursue highly risky investment strategies. They
will seek investments where a large probability of making a profit is subsidized by
taking on the risk of a small probability of a catastrophic loss.
In the first part of this paper we will prove that in these same market models
such traders are not prevented from pursuing such strategies by the imposition of
ES and VaR limits. Moreover, imposing these limits does not decrease the expected
value that the trader can achieve, so these limits have no economic impact upon
the trader. The trader is unperturbed by the constraint and will continue to pursue
the high-risk investment strategies, and, in this sense, the risk constraints can be
said to be ineffective.
The key assumptions that we make to obtain this result are that the S-shaped
function is sufficiently concave in the left tail, and that the market is a complete
one period market model with a non-zero market price of risk. These assump-
tions apply to the benchmark case of the Black-Scholes model, to traders with
S-shaped utilities of the standard functional form proposed in Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), and to traders with limited liability.
To understand intuitively why ES may fail to constrain a trader, it is helpful
to know that it is possible to manufacture digital options (as shown in Figure
3) that have negative ES and that can be purchased at no cost. This may seem
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counter-intuitive as one might expect that a riskless position (as measured with
ES), with a non-zero potential upside, should have a positive cost. However, this
argument fails because, in complete markets, prices are evaluated using the Q
measure whereas risk is assessed in the P measure. In the Black-Scholes model
the ratio of the Q measure density to the P measure density is unbounded, and
this unbounded discrepancy between the measures can be leveraged to create such
digital positions. An arbitrarily large multiple of such a position will then give a
trader with limited liability an arbitrarily large upside, will cost nothing, and will
not violate a given ES constraint. The precise result proved in this paper is in fact
slightly stronger than implied by this argument. We will show in future work how
this intuitive example can be applied to other coherent risk measures.1
We note, that the same mathematical model can be applied whether the
“trader” is an individual trader working in a bank, an independent investor, or
an institution. We have focussed on the relationship between a trader and their
risk manager, but similar considerations would apply to a regulator who wishes to
control the behaviour of a bank.
In summary, the first part of the paper gives a negative result on the use of
ES for curbing excessive tail-risk-seeking behaviour. The natural question is what
alternatives could work?
In the second part of the paper we introduce a possible solution. We consider
the same optimization problem, but with risk constraints imposed by requiring
that the expected value of a concave increasing function, uR, applied to the payoff
must be above some limit. We show that, under rather modest assumptions,
1Reference omitted to preserve double blind
5
such constraints are effective, i.e. they decrease the excepted utility the trader can
achieve. Hence imposing such constraints will have an economic impact upon the
trader.
Since uR has the form of a conventional utility function, we will refer to such
constraints as expected utility constraints. We refer to uR rather loosely as the
risk manager’s choice of utility function, but this terminology is not intended to
imply that uR represents the personal risk preferences of the risk manager. The
risk manager should choose uR to represent the preferences of whoever bears the
losses between different possible payoff distributions. The risk manager should
then choose the limit to reflect the maximum acceptable level of risk. Setting risk
limits in this way is not standard practice, but our result does demonstrate that, in
principle at least, it is possible to set effective risk limits. In practice one might try
to implement such limits by choosing a one parameter family of utility functions,
uR, such as the family of exponential utilities. Two parameters would then be
required to specify a risk constraint: a risk aversion level and a limit, which could
be expressed as a cash equivalent value. Thus the number of parameters required
in practice would be the same as the number of parameters required to specify an
ES constraint.
We have focussed so far upon the economic impact on the trader. We should
also consider the economic impact on whoever bears the cost of any losses. Let
us assume that the loss-bearer’s preferences are given by the conventional concave
increasing utility function uR applied to the investment returns. Taken together,
our first and second results imply that the expected utility of the loss-bearer will
be higher if they impose expected utility constraints rather than ES or VaR con-
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straints. Thus our results have economic consequences for the loss-bearer.
We now present a literature review of earlier related work. We keep this short
due to space constraints.2
Utility optimization under risk measure constraints was considered in Basak
and Shapiro (2001), which adopts a framework that is the same as we adopt in this
paper, except that they use a standard concave increasing utility function where
we use an S-shaped utility function. They show that in their model, in cases where
large losses occur, even larger losses occur under VaR based risk management.
In Cuoco et al. (2008), it is shown that VaR constraints behave better when the
portfolio VaR is re-evaluated dynamically by incorporating available conditioning
information, as is done in practice. Again this is done under standard, rather than
S-shaped, utility.
As there has been growing interest in the work of Kahneman and Tversky
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and its application,
there is now an extensive literature addressing non-concave objective functions.
We refer, for example, to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis et al. (2001),
Berkelaar et al. (2004), Gomes (2005), Carassus and Rásonyi (2015), Bernard and
Ghossoub (2010), He and Zhou (2011a), and Rieger (2012). S-shaped utility has
also been studied in more general contexts than finding optimal payoffs under
risk constraints. For example, in Henderson (2012) the disposition effect in the
presence of S-shaped utility is considered.
Further related research has appeared in a series of papers by Xunyu Zhou and
2We have a more comprehensive literature review on the online preprint that we omit
citing to preserve double blind
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co-authors (Jin and Zhou, 2008; Zhou, 2010; He and Zhou, 2011b; He et al., 2015).3
While we only consider S-shaped utility, these papers deal with prospect theory
in full and include probability weighting in the analysis. They anticipate some of
the techniques and proofs we consider here, and the notion of X-rearrangement
in particular. Where we depart from these papers is in the economic aims of our
research. We wish to investigate the effectiveness of commonly imposed risk con-
straints such as VaR and ES in constraining traders, whereas the existing research
is interested in determining how a trader with S-shaped utility should behave in
practice. As a result, the specific economic problems we consider of optimization
under ES and utility constraints are different from those studied in (Jin and Zhou,
2008; Zhou, 2010; He and Zhou, 2011b; He et al., 2015).
Our contribution is to apply the theory of optimization with S-shaped utility
functions to the study of ES and to thereby highlight a potential weakness of ES as
a means of setting risk limits. We believe that risk managers, regulators and policy
makers should be aware of this potential weakness since ES is the risk measure
officially endorsed by the Basel committee. As such this paper should be viewed
as a contribution to the literature on the merits and demerits of different risk mea-
sures. Let us briefly mention some aspects of this extensive literature. Artzner
et al. (1999) proposed that risk measures should encourage diversification and this
motivated their definition of coherent risk measures. VaR is not a coherent risk
measure, and, partly as a result of this criticism, the Basel committee moved from
endorsing VaR as a risk measure to endorsing ES. This line of research and its
3again, in our online preprint we discuss such references more in detail and add others.
We do not cite this preprint here to preserve double blind
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history is discussed in detail in Föllmer and Schied (2011). Another consideration
that has been debated is that it may be desirable for risk measures to be “elic-
itable”, a statistical concept related to backtesting risk measures (Gneiting, 2011;
Nolde and Ziegel, 2017). One further, less technical, consideration is how easy it is
for a non-specialist to understand the meaning of any given risk figure. This point
is discussed in, for example, Acerbi and Scandolo (2008). The paper Emmer et al.
(2015) gives a fuller discussion of the pros and cons of different risk measures and
the history of this field. They also attempt to evaluate what risk measures work
best in practice. Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing that the ef-
fectiveness of risk limits in controlling excessive risk-seeking behaviour should also
be considered when evaluating the pros and cons of different risk measurement
methodologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce S-shaped utility
and define the notion of a tail-risk-seeking market player. In Section 3 we formally
introduce the optimization problem that will be used in the paper and state a
theorem which shows how the optimization problem can be solved by studying the
relationship between the pricing measure Q and the physical measure P. In Section
4 we state the main negative result of the paper that shows that ES is ineffective
in curbing the excessive risk taking of tail-risk-seeking investors in markets such as
the Black–Scholes options market. Section 5 states the main positive result of this
paper, namely that limits based on expected utility constraints can be effective in




Figure 1: An S-Shaped utility function.
2. S-shaped utility and limited liability
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observed that individuals appear to have pref-
erences governed by an S-shaped utility function. By “S-shaped” utility Kahneman
and Tversky mean the following properties.
(i) The utility is increasing.
(ii) The utility is strictly convex on the left.
(iii) The utility is strictly concave on the right.
(iv) The utility is non-differentiable at the origin.
(v) The utility is asymmetrical: negative events are considered worse than posi-
tive events are considered good.
A typical S-shaped utility function is shown in Figure 1. The prototypical example
of S-shaped utility (see for example Föllmer and Schied (2011), Formula 2.9) is
u(x) = xγ1{x≥0} − λ(−x)γ1{x<0}, (1)
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for a zero benchmark level, with λ > 0 and 0 < γ ≤ 1.
It is generally agreed that an individual who is rational, loss-averse and risk-
averse should have a utility function which is increasing and concave. Thus Kah-
neman and Tversky’s result appears to give empirical evidence for the hypothesis
that either individuals are not risk-averse or they do not behave rationally.
Alternatively, one might argue that the behaviour is due to failing to fully
analyse the actual returns experienced by actors. For example, a trader who is
not particularly conscientious may be interested in their pay packet and not in the
performance of their portfolios. Thus the fact that such a trader may be willing
to risk enormous losses is perfectly consistent with risk aversion: they personally
only lose their job, and possibly their reputation, even if they bring down the bank
they are working for. The utility of such traders should be calculated by applying
a conventional concave increasing function to their pay packet. The net effect is
that their utility can still be calculated by applying an S-shaped function u to the
portfolio value. If one incorrectly interprets u as the trader’s personal preferences
over gains and losses, one is given a false impression that these traders are not
risk-averse. Similarly, it is perfectly rational and risk-averse for a limited liability
company to take enormous risks with other people’s money.
Whether these S-shaped functions arise due to a lack of risk aversion, irrational-
ity or limited liability, there is certainly good evidence that they are a useful tool
for modelling real-world behaviour. A regulator or risk manager should certainly
consider the possibility that they must regulate or manage actors who behave as
though governed by S-shaped utility. For the sake of readability, in the rest of
this paper we will use the term utility function for this S-shaped curve whether it
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arrives through risk preferences or limited liability.
Not all of the characteristics of S-shaped utility functions are important to
us in this paper. We are primarily interested in the convexity on the left. Moti-
vated by Kahneman and Tversky’s original example (1), we introduce the following
definition.
Definition 2.1. An increasing function u : R −→ R (to be thought of as a utility
function) is said to be “risk-seeking in the left tail” if there exist constants N ≤ 0,
η ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 such that:
u(x) > −c|x|η ∀x ≤ N. (2)
Similarly u is said to be “risk-averse in the right tail” if there exists N ≥ 0,
η ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 such that
u(x) < c|x|η ∀x ≥ N. (3)
The first definition will be helpful in establishing the main negative result of
the paper, namely that ES constraints do not change the maximum expected S-
shaped utility of the trader, who will thus not feel constrained by them. In the
proof of Theorem 4.1 below, the key property will be the behaviour of the left tail
of the utility function, which must be bounded from below by a curve growing
like a power function with exponent smaller than one, and thus convex. In other
words, the left tail of the utility function is not allowed to decrease too fast for
negative losses, and decreases at smaller and smaller speeds as losses increase.
Economically, this constrains the utility function to conform to a pattern that is
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reminiscent of “limited liability”, where larger and larger losses are weighted less
and less in relative terms. We need this pattern only from some point onward, and
not on the whole negative axis, which explains the role of the constant N in our
definition.
The standard pictures of “S-shaped” utility functions in the literature appear
to have the above properties. Furthermore the S-shaped utility functions that arise
due to a limited liability are bounded below, and so would certainly be risk-seeking
in the left tail.
We give a formal definition of S-shaped for the purposes of this paper.
Definition 2.2. A function u is said to be “S-shaped” if:
1. u is increasing;
2. u(x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ 0;
3. u(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0;
4. for x ≥ 0, u(x) is concave;
5. u is risk-seeking in the left tail;
6. u is risk-averse in the right tail.
As we hinted above, only the tail behaviour of the utility is needed in the proof
of our results. Definition 2.2 thus allows more general shapes of utility function
than that illustrated in Figure 1. For example, the trader utility for losses can
become negative very fast in proximity to the level of negative wealth that






Figure 2: An example of S-shaped curve (red), whose tails are bounded by a classic S-
shaped utility (blue), as in Definition 2.2
beyond this point. An example of S-shaped function satisfying Definition 2.2
is given in Figure 2.
Note that, in Kahneman and Tversky’s studies of economic behaviour, the
horizontal coordinate of the point of inflection of the utility curve is normally
very significant. They found that the position of the inflection point depends
upon whether the problem is framed in a manner that makes individuals focus
upon the potential gains or upon the potential losses. It is for this reason
that we have labelled the horizontal axis in Figure 1 as “gains/losses” rather
than as “terminal wealth”. Nevertheless, for the results given in this paper
it is only the tail behaviour that is important, and we make no assumptions
about the location of the point of inflection.
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3. The problem and the law-invariant portfolio optimization set-
ting
Our problem sees a trader who is trying to maximize their expected util-
ity by designing a suitable payoff, while being subject to budget and risk
constraints:
Find the payoff that maximizes Expected(utility(payoff)) (4)
subject to Budget constraint: Price(payoff) ≤ C
Risk constraint: Risk measure(payoff) ≥ L.
We now introduce a mathematical framework to formalize this problem.
We present the technicalities that will allow us to formulate our portfolio
optimization problem as a problem based only on probability distributions
of the relevant quantities.
We will work both under the objective probability measure P, to model
risk measures, and under the pricing or risk neutral measure Q, needed for
prices in the budget constraint. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, and let
dQ




dP dP(ω) = 1. The random variable
dQ
dP encodes the relationship between the two probability measures P and Q,
and is related to the market price of risk and risk premia. We will use this
setting to represent a complete financial market as follows:
(i) We assume there is a fixed risk free interest rate, r, assumed to be a
deterministic constant.
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(ii) Given a payoff, f (a random variable), one can purchase a derivative
security with payoff f at time T for the price given by the risk neutral











assuming that this integral exists.
We note that the properties we require of dQ
dP allow us to define a measure
dQ := dQ
dP dP, justifying our notation.
In Appendix A, we list some technical conventions and details that will
be needed in this section, but that are not of immediate interest for the
reader. We refer to [arXiv SSRN preprint link removed for double blind] for
full details.
We assume that the investor’s preferences are encoded by a preference
functional, v, that takes as argument probability distribution functions, F ,
of random variables. This means that an investor will prefer a security with
payoff f over a security with payoff g if and only if v(Ff ) > v(Fg) (we are
writing Ff for the cumulative distribution function of the random variable
f). Thus the investor’s preferences are law-invariant, in the sense that two
payoffs, f and g, with the same law, Ff = Fg, will have the same investor
preferences, v(Ff ) = v(Fg).
We assume that the investor has a fixed budget, C, so that they can only
16
purchase securities with payoff, f , costing less than C. Hence









dP(ω) ≤ C. (6)
We assume that all the other trading constraints, namely the risk con-
straints, are law-invariant. For example: the investor may have to ensure
that the minimum payoff is almost surely above a certain level; they may be
operating under ES or VaR constraints; they may be operating under con-
straints based on a second utility function. We model the combined trading
constraints using a set, A, of admissible cumulative distribution functions
and requiring that Ff ∈ A. In other words, a payoff, f , will satisfy our
risk (and possibly other) constraints when the cumulative distribution func-
tion, Ff , of f is in A. This provides a unifying framework for VaR, ES and
constraints based on expected utility.










(ω) dP(ω) ≤ C
and risk management constraints Ff ∈ A.
(7)
In Appendix B, we prove the following theorem which shows we may
assume f has a particular form when solving (7).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the sample space Ω is non-atomic. Let FdQ
dP
17
denote the cumulative distribution function of the random variable dQ
dP . Let
Ff denote the cumulative distribution function of the random variable f .
There exists a uniformly distributed random variable U such that:
(i) dQ
dP = (1− FdQdP )
−1(U) almost surely;
(ii) if f satisfies the price and risk management constraints of (7), then
ϕ(U) = F−1f (U)
also satisfies the constraints of (7), and is equal to f in distribution, and
hence has the same objective value as f , namely v(Ff ) = v(F
−1
f (U)).
What is remarkable in the above theorem is that we can use the same
uniform random variable U for re-scaling both dP
dQ and f . It is a general
property of random variables that every random variable can be expressed
as the inverse of its cumulative distribution function (or inverse of its survival





)−1(U1) and f = F
−1
f (U2)
for two suitable uniform random variables U1 and U2. What is more surpris-
ing is that we can actually put a single uniform U in both transformations
and preserve the price (and risk) constraints of the optimization problem.
The optimization problem with a single U will be much simpler since the
optimization will run over a single random variable rather than two. Proving
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our theorems in the next sections will be possible thanks to this simplifica-
tion.
4. Portfolio optimization with S-shaped utility and ES constraints
Let u be a function which need not necessarily be either concave or in-
creasing. Consider problem (7) where the objective, v, is the expected utility
for u, and where we have a single ES constraint. For a definition of VaR
and ES, we refer, for example, to McNeil et al. (2015) or Acerbi and Tasche
(2002). Suppose our probability model is non-atomic, and let U be the ran-
dom variable given in Theorem 3.1, and define q = 1−FdQ
dP
, so q is a decreasing
function.
By Theorem 3.1, under an ES risk constraint the optimization problem







subject to the price constraint
∫ 1
0
ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤ C (9)





ϕ(x) dx ≥ L. (10)
Moreover, this map preserves the objective values and the supremum.
Note that the ES representation in the left hand side of (10) comes from
(3.3) in Acerbi and Tasche (2002).
We are now ready to state the main negative result of this paper.
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Figure 3: Type of payoff whose limit for α→ 0 (implying k2(α) ↓ −∞) is used to find the
supremum utility value
Theorem 4.1 (Irrelevance of ES constraints for tail-risk-seekers). Suppose




then the supremum value of the optimization problem (8) (9) under the ES
constraint (10) is the same as the supremum value of the unconstrained prob-
lem, supu.
The proof is presented in Appendix C. We can see the type of payoff
leading to the supremum in the proof. A sketch of the form of the payoff
is given in Figure 3. In this figure we focus on an example with positive k1
and negative k2 = k2(α) = k1 + p(L− k1)/α. If we assume L to be negative
then for α ↓ 0 we have k2 ↓ −∞ for any positive k1. Essentially the payoff
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we use is a digital option with a very large (in absolute value) negative value
k2 in a very small area of size α near 0, and with a much smaller positive
payoff k1 in the large area [α, 1]. This is the type of payoff that satisfies
the budget and ES (or VaR) constraints while producing larger and larger
expected S-shaped utility as α ↓ 0.
Example. Consider an investor who wishes to optimize their utility at time
T by investing in options on a single underlying, all options with maturity
T . This investor will follow a buy and hold strategy, but their portfolio will
be an option portfolio. We assume that put and call options can be bought
and sold at a wide variety of strikes and so the market can be reasonably well
approximated by a complete market. In this market any European derivative
whose payoff is a function of the final stock price, otherwise known as simple
contingent claim, can be bought or sold at a fixed price.
We must choose a model for the price of these derivatives. As an example,
we will consider European derivatives on a stock which follows the Black–
Scholes–Merton model.
In Appendix D, we show that European derivatives at time T in the Black–
Scholes–Merton market satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 4.1. We have,
therefore, the following
Corollary 4.2 (Irrelevance of ES in reducing tail-risk-seeking behaviour in
a Black–Scholes market). In a Black–Scholes market, the expected utility of
an investor who is risk-seeking in the left tail and constrained only by ES
or VaR constraints is limited only by the supremum of their utility function.
21
Investors can achieve any desired expected utility below this supremum by
trading in the bond and a digital option. ES constraints do not impact the
supremum of the expected utility.
5. Portfolio optimization with limited liability and utility constraints
We have stated an important but negative result: tail-risk-seeking in-
vestors and investors who aim to maximize S-shaped utilities are not im-
pacted by ES constraints. While this tells us that (in this context) ES is not
effective in curbing excessive risk taking, what should one do instead? We
have reached the point in the paper where we can make a positive proposal
for an alternative approach.
Let us return to Problem (7). We suppose that the regulator is indifferent
to the precise outcome if the portfolio payoff is positive, and so imposes a
risk constraint on the expected utility of the negative part of the payoff.
We specialise our analysis to the case where the investor is indifferent to
the outcome if the portfolio payoff is negative. This means that we feel
free to set the investor utility, uI , to zero in the negative domain of the
utility function. A possible cause for this preference is that the trader has
de facto “limited liability” towards the bank, in the sense we explained in
the introduction. We model this setup by choosing two utility functions
uR and uI , representing the regulator and the investor’s utility functions
respectively. The two utility functions will turn out to be rather different, as
the preferences of the trader and of the risk manager will be rather different.
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We will now present a theorem that will allow us to solve Problem (7) with
a new risk constraint based on uR. We will need the following definitions for
the terms arising in Problem (7). Define the preference functional, vI(Ff ),
as the expected uI-utility, vI(Ff ) = E[uI(f)] =
∫∞
−∞ uI(x) dFf (x). Define
the set, A, of admissible distribution functions satisfying the risk constraint
AR =
{
Ff | E[uR(f)] =
∫∞
−∞ uR(x) dFf (x) ≥ L
}
for a given negative level L.
Define q(x) = (1− FdQ
dP
)−1(x).
Theorem 5.1. Let uR be a concave increasing function (associated with the
risk constraint utility function) equal to 0 when x ≥ 0, defining the admissible
set A = AR above. Let uI be an increasing function equal to 0 when x ≤ 0
and concave in the region x ≥ 0 (associated with the investor utility function).
Given p ∈ [0, 1], define C1(p) ∈ R ∪ {−∞} to be the infimum of the
optimization problem
inf







uR(f1(x)) dx ≥ L.
(11)
Define V (p) ∈ R ∪ {∞} to be the supremum of the optimization problem
sup







f2(x)q(x)dx ≤ C2(p) := erTC − C1(p).
(12)
The supremum of the problem (7) with A = AR and v = vI is equal to
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supp∈[0,1] V (p).
Remark. The value of the theorem comes from the fact that the problems
(11) and (12) are easy to solve, see Lemma F.1 below. One may then compute
supp∈[0,1] V (p) by line search. Moreover, it is simple to obtain an explicit
solution of (7) given solutions to each of these simpler problems. The risk
constraint will typically be binding, unlike the case of ES constraints.
Remark. Although we have specialised to the case of limited liability, note
that the strategies pursued by an investor with limited liability will be at least
as aggressive as those pursued by an investor with a more general S-shaped
utility. Thus if we can find bounds for an investor with limited liability,
we will obtain bounds for more general S-shaped utilities. Finding explicit
solutions to the problem (7) for general S-shaped utilities would seem a rather
more difficult problem.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Appendix E.
The case when the supremum of the optimization problem (12) is equal
to the supremum of the investor’s utility function uI is rather uninteresting
as the risk constraints clearly will play no role. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 5.2. In a given market, an investor with utility function uI is
said to be difficult to satisfy if the supremum of the optimization problem
(12) is less then the supremum of their utility function for any finite cost
constraint C2 and any p ∈ (0, 1).
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We now compute the solution of the problem in Theorem 5.1 in a specific
case where both the investor and the risk management uI and uR are power
functions with exponents smaller (S-shaped) and larger (risk aversion) than
one, respectively. The significance of this computation is that it will allow us
to immediately write down an upper bound on the solution of the problem
in 5.1 for many financially interesting cases.
Theorem 5.3. Let γR ∈ (1,∞) be given. Let uR(x) = −(−x)γR1{x≤0} + 0×
1{x>0}.
Suppose that we wish to solve the optimization problem of Theorem 5.1
and that uI is such that the investor is difficult to satisfy. The risk constraint








If the investor’s utility function is given by uI(x) = x
γI1{x≥0}+ 0× 1{x<0}









This theorem is proved in Appendix F.
We now summarize the key findings of the paper in a single theorem.
Using power functions for uI and uR, we will show that if the investor has
an S-shaped uI , then one can build a sequence of portfolios whose expected
uI grow larger and larger (to infinity) while ES constraints remain satisfied.
For any such sequence of portfolios, the expected uR will meanwhile grow
increasingly negative (to minus infinity). Thus to achieve the large values
of expected uI that are possible, the trader must take excessive risks as
measured by expected uR.
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Theorem 5.4. Suppose that (Ω,F ,P) and dQ










An investor with S-shaped utility function, uI , who is subject only to ES
constraints can find a sequence of portfolios satisfying these constraints whose
expected uI-utility tends to infinity. If, in addition, the investor is difficult
to satisfy, and uR is the function uR(x) = −(−x)γR1{x≤0} + 0 × 1{x>0} with
γR > 1 and e(γR) finite, then any sequence of portfolios whose expected uI-
utility tends to infinity will have expected uR utility tending to −∞.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.3 and our formal
definition of S-shaped utility.
Remark. The conditions that e(γR) is finite and that the investor is difficult
to satisfy are always satisfied for the market of derivatives on the Black–
Scholes–Merton market when the market price of risk is non-zero and the
investor utility function uI is not bounded above. This is proved in Appendix
D.1.
A comment on the choice of uR is in order. If the risk manager is to
choose a uR, how should they proceed? Suppose that we agree, for practical
reasons, to limit ourselves to a parametric form such as the power function
above. One would have to find a way to select the exponent γR to be used
in the risk management constraint. This could be based on trial and error
on some test portfolios, and on analyzing how constraints based on different
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exponents would have fared through history. The parameter γR would have
the clear interpretation of expressing how we weight larger and larger losses in
our risk constraint. Small γR would mean less weight, large γR more weight.
The choice of γR may seem partly arbitrary, however even in measures such as
VaR and ES the choice of the confidence level is somewhat arbitrary before
one knows the tail structure of the portfolio loss distribution. This is not
to say that the choice of γR would be straightforward, as this would be a
matter for further research, but it is definitely plausible that a calibration of
γR based on historical simulation on some key portfolios may be possible.
6. Conclusions
We have shown that in typical complete markets with non-zero market
price of risk, ES constraints do not affect the supremum of the investor utility
that can be achieved by an investor with S-shaped utility, uI . By contrast,
replacing the ES constraints with even very weak expected utility constraints
for a concave increasing limiting utility function can reduce the supremum
that can be achieved. In these circumstances, if a risk manager with such
a concave increasing utility function, uR, only imposes ES constraints, they
should expect that tail-risk-seeking investors and limited liability investors
will choose investment strategies with infinitely bad uR-utilities. These find-
ings were stated in full detail in Theorem 5.4.
We believe that this shows that VaR or ES constraints alone are insuf-
ficient to constrain the behaviour of tail-risk-seeking investors and limited
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liability investors, and that concave utility risk constraints could be used
instead.
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Appendix A Technical assumptions and details for Section 3
In convex analysis it is often convenient to allow infinite values in calcula-
tions (see Rockafellar (2015)). We will use the following conventions. Let us
write f+ and f− for the positive and negative parts of a measurable function
f . Suppose that
∫
Ω
f+(ω) dP is finite but
∫
Ω




f(ω) dP = −∞. We can similarly define what it means for an
integral to equal +∞.
We will be considering investment under cost constraints as in Eq. (6).
In our model we will assume that it is possible to purchase a derivative with
payoff f(ω) whose price as given in (6) is −∞. At an intuitive level, we
are simply saying that one can always purchase an asset if one is willing
to overpay. Assets where the cost is +∞, or where the price is undefined,
cannot be purchased.
Appendix B Proof of Theorem 3.1
First let F−1f denote generalized inverse of the cumulative distribution
function Ff defined by F
−1
f (p) := inf{x : Ff (x) ≥ p}. We similarly write (1−
Ff )
−1 for the generalized inverse of complementary cumulative distribution
function which is defined by (1− Ff )−1(p) := inf{x | 1− Ff (x) ≤ p}.
To prove Theorem 3.1, we define the notion of X-rearrangement.
Definition B.1. Given random variables X, f ∈ L0(Ω,R) with X having a
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continuous distribution we define the X-rearrangement of f , denoted fX by:
fX(ω) = F−1f (P(X ≤ X(ω))) = F
−1
f (FX(X(ω))).
Lemma B.2. The X-rearrangement has the following properties:
(i) If X has a continuous probability distribution then fX is equal to f in
distribution.
(ii) If k ∈ R then (max{f, k})X = max{fX , k} and (min{f, k})X = min{fX , k}
(iii) fX = (f+)X + (f−)X .
(iv) XX = X almost surely.
(v) If g(ω) = G(X(ω)) with G increasing and if X has a continuous prob-
ability distribution then gX = g almost surely.
Proof of (i). We recall that: for any distribution function F with generalized
inverse F−1, F−1(p) ≤ x if and only if p ≤ F (x); FX ◦ F−1X = id if X has a
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continuous distribution. Hence if X has a continuous distribution:
FfX (y) = P(fX(ω) ≤ y)
= P(F−1f (P(X ≤ X(ω)) ≤ y)
= P(P(X ≤ X(ω)) ≤ Ff (y))
= P(FX(X(ω)) ≤ Ff (y))





Proof of (ii). The result follows from the definition of fX and the following
identities:
F−1max{f,k}(t) = inf{z ∈ R : P(max{f, k} ≤ z) ≥ t}
= inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z and k ≤ z) ≥ t}
= max{inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z) ≥ t}, k}
= max{F−1f (t), k}.
F−1min{f,k}(p) = inf{z ∈ R : P(min{f, k} ≤ z) ≥ p}
= inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z or k ≤ z) ≥ p}
= min{inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z) ≥ p}, k}
= min{F−1f (p), k}.
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Proof of (iii). We use (ii) to derive the following identity
F−1f (p) = (F
−1
f )
+(p) + (F−1f )
−(p)
= max{F−1f (p), 0}+ min{F
−1
f (p), 0}
= F−1max{f,0}(p) + F
−1
min{f,0}(p)
= F−1f+ (t) + F
−1
f− .
The result now follows from the definition of fX .
Proof of (iv). We wish to prove that the set
A = {W ∈ Ω : F−1X F
XX(W ) 6= X(W )}
is null.
We recall that
F−1X FX(x) ≤ x and FXF
−1
X (p) ≥ p (14)




X FX(x)) ≤ FX(x)
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and the second implies
FXF
−1




X FX(x) = FX(x). (15)
Suppose that F−1X is continuous at FXX(W ) ∈ [0, 1] then
F−1X FXX(W ) = inf{F
−1
X (q) | q > FXX(W )}
= inf{inf{x | FX(x) ≥ q} | q > FXX(W )}
= inf{x | FX(x) > FXX(W )}
≥ X(W ).
But by (14), F−1X FXX(W ) ≤ X(W ) for all W ∈ Ω. So if F
−1
X is continuous
at FXX(W ) then F
−1
X FXX(W ) = X(W ), so W /∈ A. Let P denote the set




{ω | F−1X FXX(ω) 6= X(ω) and FXX(ω) = p}.
Since F−1X is monotone, P is countable. Thus we can find a countable set
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Ai : = {ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) 6= X(ω) and FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)}
= {ω | FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) = X(ω)}.
(17)
We now note that
{ω | FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)} =
{ω | FXX(ω) ≤ FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | FXX(ω) < FXX(ωi)} (18)
and
{ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) = X(ω)} =





X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi) =⇒ X(ω) < inf{x : FX(x) ≥ FXX(ωi)}
=⇒ FXX(ω) < FXX(ωi).
(20)
Conversely we can use (15) to see that
FXX(ω) < FxX(ωi) =⇒ FXX(ω) < FXF−1X FXX(ωi)
=⇒ X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi)
(21)
since FX is increasing. Together (20) and (21) imply
{ω | FXX(ω) < FXX(ωi)} = {ω | X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi)}. (22)
We use (18), (19) and (22) to rewrite (17) as
Ai = {ω | FXX(ω) ≤ FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | X(ω) ≤ F−1X FXX(ωi)}. (23)
Let Li = {ω | X(ω) ≤ F−1X FXX(ωi)}. We use (15) to compute that
P(ω ∈ Li) = FXF−1X FXX(ωi) = FXX(ωi). (24)
Let Ri = {ω ∈ Ω | FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)}. We know Ri is non empty since
it contains ωi. Therefore we may choose a sequence v
j
i in Ri such that X(v
j
i )
is increasing and has limit equal to supv∈Ri X(v). Moreover if this supremum
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is obtained we may assume that the sequence X(vji ) obtains its limit.
{ω | FXX(ω) ≤ FXX(ωi)} =
⋃
x




{ω | X(ω) ≤ X(vji ) and FXX(v
j










Where V ji := {ω | X(ω) ≤ X(v
j
i )}. We now compute that
P(ω ∈ V ji ) = FXX(v
j
i ) = FXX(ωi), (26)
since vji ∈ Ri.
Since F−1X FXX(ωi) = inf{X(ω) | ω ∈ Ri} ≤ X(v
j
i ) we see that Li ⊆ V
j
i .
Hence P(ω ∈ V ji \Li) = P(ω ∈ V
j
i )−P(ω ∈ Li) = 0, using (26) and (24). By






(V ji \ Li).
So Ai is a countable union of null sets and hence is null.
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Proof of (v). We define a generalized inverse for G by
G−1(y) = sup{x ∈ R | G(x) ≤ y}.
We define a function G̃ by
G̃(x) = inf{G(x′) | x′ ≥ x}.
We see that G̃(x) = G(x) except possibly at the discontinuities of G.
We note that
G̃(x) ≤ y ⇐⇒ inf{G(x′) | x′ ≥ x} ≤ y
⇐⇒ ∃x′ with G(x′) ≤ y and x′ ≥ x
⇐⇒ x ≤ sup{x′ | G(x′) ≤ y}
⇐⇒ x ≤ G−1(y).
(27)
We define g̃(ω) = G̃XX(ω). G is monotone so only has a countable
number of discontinuities. Let D denote the set of discontinuities of G.
Then G̃(x) = G(x) unless x ∈ D. So the set of ω for which g̃(ω) 6= g(ω)
is contained in X−1(D) ∪ A where A is the null set defined in (iv). By the
continuity of the distribution of X, X−1(x) is a null set for all x. Hence g̃ = g
almost surely.
We now wish to calculate gX(W ) for W ∈ Ω. In the calculation below,
W should be thought of as fixed and ω should be thought of as a random
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scenario. So, for example P(X(ω) ≤ X(W )) = FX(X(W )).
gX(W ) = F−1g (P(X(ω) ≤ X(W )))
= F−1g̃ (P(X(ω) ≤ X(W )))
= inf{x | Fg̃(x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))}
= inf{x | FG̃X(x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))}
= inf{x | P(G̃X(ω) ≤ x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))}
= inf{x | P(X(ω) ≤ G−1x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))} (by (27))
= inf{x | FX(G−1x) ≥ FX(X(W ))}
= inf{x | G−1x ≥ XX(W )}
= inf{x | XX(W ) ≤ G−1x} (by (27))
= inf{x | G̃(XX(W )) ≤ x}
= G̃XX(W )
= g̃(W ).
Hence gX = g almost surely.
Lemma B.3. If f, g ∈ L0(Ω;R) and:
(i) f(ω) ≥ k for some k ∈ R;




g dP <∞ ;







fXgX dP ≤ ∞.
Proof. (Note: this proof is modelled on the proof of the Hardy–Littlewood
inequality for “symmetric decreasing rearrangements”.)
Since f ≥ k we have the “layer-cake” representation of f











We note that for any random variable h
L(hX , x) = {ω | hX(ω) > x}
= {ω | F−1h (P(X ≤ X(ω)) > x}
= {ω | P(X ≤ X(ω)) > Fh(x)}.
Hence for any h1, h2, x1, x2 either
L(hX1 , x1) ⊆ L(hX2 , x2) or L(hX2 , x2) ⊆ L(hX1 , x1). (28)
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We also note that
P(L(h, x)) = P(h(ω) > x) = 1− Fh(x).
In particular P(L(h, x)) only depends upon the distribution of h and hence
P(L(hX , x)) = P(L(h, x)) by Lemma B.2.
We now compute:
EP(1L(fX , x+ k)(ω)1L(gX , y)(ω)) = P(L(fX , (x+ k)) ∩ L(gX , y))
= min{P(L(fX , (x+ k))),P(L(gX , y))} by (28)
= min{P(L(f, (x+ k))),P(L(g, y))}
≥ P(L(f, (x+ k)) ∩ L(g, y))
= EP(1L(f, x+ k)(ω)1L(g, y)(ω)).
(29)
Using the fact that f is bounded below and
∫
Ω
g dP <∞ we deduce that
∫
Ω
(fg)− dP > −∞.
By Lemma B.2, fX is also bounded below and g = gX in distribution so∫
Ω
gXdP <∞. Hence ∫
Ω
(fXgX)− dP > −∞.
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Therefore we may use the layer-cake representations of f , g, fX and gX
together with Fubini’s theorem and (29) to compute:
∫
Ω

































X , x+ k)(ω)1L(g





Lemma B.4. If f, g ∈ L0(Ω;R) and:
(i)
∫
fg dP > −∞;













fXgX dP ≤ ∞.
Proof. In this proof, given a real k and random variable f , we will write fk
as an abbreviation for the random variable max{f(ω), k}. Lemma B.2 tells
us (fk)






(fg)−dP > −∞. Since g ≥ 0, (fg)− = f−g, hence
∫
f−g dP >



















X dP for all k.
As k → −∞, f−k (ω) ↓ f−(ω) and (f−)Xk (ω) ↓ (f−)X(ω) for all ω. So by





































Lemma B.5. If (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic and Q ∈ L0(Ω;R) is a random
variable on Ω, then there exists a uniform random variable X ∈ L0(Ω;R)
such that Q(ω) = F−1Q (X(ω)).
Proof. Sierpiński’s theorem on non-atomic measures tells us that for all 0 ≤
α ≤ 1 there is a measurable set E ⊆ Ω of measure α (Sierpiński, 1922).
One deduces that there is a uniformly distributed random variable U on
Ω. To see this, first partition Ω into two subsets of measure 1
2
, we will call
this partition Level 1. We define a random variable X1 which is equal to
1
2
on the first subset of Level 1 and equal to 1 on the second subset of Level 1.
Inductively we partition each subset of Level n into two equally sized subsets
and define Xn by Xn−1 − 12n on the first subsets and Xn−1 on the second
subsets. The distribution function of Xn will be a step function from 0 to 1
with 2n uniform steps. By construction, Xn(ω) is decreasing for each ω ∈ Ω.
Hence Xn converges pointwise, hence almost surely, hence in distribution to
some random variable X. Thus X must be uniformly distributed.
At each point x ∈ R where there is a discontinuity of FQ consider the set
Ωx = F
−1
Q (x). This set has non-zero measure FQ(x)−F
−
Q (x) where F
−
Q (x) is
the left limit of the distribution function at x. Note that FQ(x) − F−Q (x) =
P(Q = x). Hence by the above we can find a measurable function Ux on Ωx
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taking values uniformly between 0 and 1. Define a random variable X by
X(ω) =

FQ(Q(ω)) if FQ is continuous at Q(ω)
FQ(x)− Ux(ω)P(Q = x) if FQ is discontinuous at x = Q(ω).
Clearly Q(ω) = F−1Q (X(ω)). We must show that X is uniformly distributed,
i.e. that P (X ≤ p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Given p ∈ [0, 1] define p− = sup(ImFQ ∩ (−∞, p]) and p+ = inf(ImFQ ∩
[p,∞)). We partition Ω into three sets A, B and C defined by
A = {ω | FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p−}
B = {ω | p− < FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p+}
C = {ω | p+ < FQ(Q(ω))}.
For all ω, X(ω) ≤ FQ(Q(ω)). So if ω ∈ A, X(ω) ≤ FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p− ≤ p.
Hence
P(X ≤ p | A) = 1. (30)
If ω ∈ B then X(ω) = p+ − Ux(ω)(p+ − p−). So




For all ω, X(ω) ≥ F−Q (Q(ω)). Since F
−
Q is a left limit, F
−
Q (Q(ω)) ≥ FQ(x)
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if x ≤ Q(ω). If ω ∈ C then F−1Q (p+) < Q(ω). We deduce that if ω ∈ C then
X(ω) ≥ F−Q (Q(ω)) ≥ FQ(F
−1
Q (p
+)) = p+ ≥ p.
We deduce that
P(X ≤ p | C) = P(X = p | C).
and moreover this probability is equal to 0 unless p+ = p. We may assume
that each Ux takes values in (0, 1) so that X(ω) never equals p
+ unless we
have that p+ = p− and F is continuous at x = F−1p+. But in this case we find
that P(x = p+) = P(Q = x) = P(Q ≤ x)− P(Q < x) = FQ(x)− F−Q (x) = 0.
So P(x = p+) = 0 and hence
P(X(ω) ≤ p | C) = 0. (32)
Since p± ∈ ImFQ we compute that






P(A) = p−, P (A ∪B) = p+, hence P (B) = p+ − p−. (33)
Since A, B and C give a partition of Ω we may combine equations (30), (31),
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(32) and (33) to obtain
P(X(ω) ≤ p) = p.
So X is uniformly distributed as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Take Q to be dQ







Suppose f satisfies the constraints of (7). We see that −(−f)X is equal





















dP ≤ ∞ by Lemma B.2.
So −(−f)X satisfies the constraints of (7).
Finally we note that
−(−f)X(ω) = −F−1−f FXX(ω) = −F
−1
−fX(ω) = (1− Ff )
−1X(ω).
The result now follows by taking U = 1−X.
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Appendix C Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We consider functions ϕ of the form:
ϕ(x) =

k1, if x ≥ α
k2, otherwise.
(34)
We require that 0 < α < p and k2 < k1. For functions of this form we can
rewrite (8) as:
F(ϕ) = αu(k2) + (1− α)u(k1) (35)















So long as k1 is sufficiently large, we will have k2 < k1. For such functions the
ES constraint is automatically satisfied and the budget constraint becomes:












Taking the limit of the left hand side of (36) as α→ 0 we obtain
pL− pk1.
On the other hand the right hand side tends to zero as α→ 0 because of our
assumptions on the function q(x). For all sufficiently large k1 we can ensure
that
pL− pk1 < −1 < 0.
So for sufficiently large k1 and sufficiently small α, the budget constraint will
hold.







Our constraints are now simply that 0 < α < δ and k1 > M for some values
δ > 0 and M > 0.
We wish to show that for sufficiently large k1, the limit of (C) as α tends
to zero is u(k1). Let us choose constants c, N and η as given in (2). We may






















pL < (p− α)X1 −
p
2


















∣∣∣∣η + (1− α)u(k1).
= −cα1−η|pL− (p− α)k1|η + (1− α)u(k1)
→ u(k1) as α→ 0
Hence the supremum of the objective function is bounded below by (supx u(x))−
ε for any ε > 0. On the other hand it is trivial that the objective function is
bounded above by supx u(x).
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Appendix D The Black-Scholes-Merton case
We consider derivatives on the final stock price in a market where one
can trade in either zero coupon bonds with (deterministic) risk free rate r or
in a non-dividend paying stock whose price at time t, St, follows a geometric
Brownian motion under the P-measure
dSt = St(µ dt+ σ dW
P
t ), S0
with drift µ, volatility σ > 0 and initial condition S0 > 0. The process W
P
t
is a standard Brownian motion under the P probability measure.
The log stock price sT = lnST , under the P-measure, is normally dis-
tributed with mean s0 + (µ − 12σ
2)T and standard deviation σ
√
T . Let us














The standard pricing theory in the Black–Scholes–Merton market tells
us that the price of a European derivative in this market can be computed
using the discounted Q-measure expectation of the payoff where the stock
price process in the Q-measure is
dSt = St(r dt+ σ dW
Q
t ), S0,
where now WQt is a standard Brownian motion under the measure Q.
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Now let (ΩD,FD,PD) be the probability space for the final log stock price
sT . The superscript D stands for “derivatives market”. This probability
space is simply R with probability density given by pBS and σ-field given by
the Borel set. We can define a random variable dQ
dP
D
(sT ) := q
BS(sT )/p
BS(sT )
on (ΩD,FD,PD). Together, dQ
dP
D
and (ΩD,FD,PD) define a market: the
market of European derivatives on the final stock price sT . For any payoff
function f of sT the price of the derivative is given by (5) so long as this
integral exists and is less than ∞. This is a complete market.
Let U be the standard uniform random variable given by FsT (sT ). We
calculate









where as usual Φ us the cumulative distribution function of the standard































assume µ > r, then this function is decreasing in U . Since U is uniform,
we conclude that this expression is equal to (1 − FdQ
dP
(U))−1. We see that if
µ > r then dQ
dP
D →∞ as U → 0. If µ < r then dQ
dP
D →∞ as U → 1.
Thus European derivatives at time T in the Black–Scholes–Merton market
satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 4.1.
Remark. We have assumed in our analysis that the horizon of the invest-
ment, T1, and the ES time horizon, T2 coincide. Typically the ES time hori-
zon is the time one estimates could be needed to liquidate the position in a
hostile market so in practice one would have T2 < T1. However, an investor
who wishes to maximize their utility at time T1 could choose to restrict them-
selves to buying derivatives with maturity T2 and then holding investing the
payoff in zero coupon bonds until time T1 in which case the payoff at time T1
would be a function of the payoff at time T2.
Remark. We have illustrated our results with the Black–Scholes–Merton
model for simplicity. The key observation was that densities for pBS and
qBS were normal but with different drifts, so the ratio qBS/pBS is unbounded.
Over sufficiently short time horizons, the density of any stochastic process
driven by Itô equations can be well approximated by multivariate normal dis-
tributions. This can be expressed rigorously using asymptotic formulae for
the heat kernel of a stochastic process (see for example Hsu (2002)). Thus
over short time horizons one expects to find that dQ
dP will be unbounded for
any market model defined using Itô calculus where the market price of risk
is non-zero. One can easily devise examples of stochastic processes which
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converge to a fixed value at a future time T , so we cannot deduce that dQ
dP will
be unbounded at time T . Nevertheless, one expects that in a realistic market
model dQ
dP will indeed be unbounded at any time T .
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5.4









where pBS and qBS are given by equations (37) and (38) respectively. On























−γσ2 − 2µ+ 2γr + σ2
)





−γσ2 − 2µ+ 2γr + σ2
)
+ 2(γ − 1)s0
)
,
c2 = 4− 4γ.








This is always negative and so the expression (39) is a Gaussian integral and
hence is finite.
It now follows from Theorem 5.3 that since uI is risk-averse on the right
and also unbounded on the right that the investor is difficult to satisfy.
Appendix E Proof of Theorem 5.1
By Theorem 3.1, the optimization problem 7 is equivalent to solving
sup











ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤ erTC.
(40)
where q = (1− FdQ
dP
)−1 and so is decreasing with integral 1.
Since in problem (40) we require that ϕ is increasing, there is some p ∈
[0, 1] such that ϕ(x) is less than 0 for x less than p and ϕ(x) is greater than
0 for x greater than p. Since the value of the integrals in the optimization
problems is unaffected by the value of ϕ at the single point p, we may also
assume that ϕ(p) = 0.
For a fixed p, we may define f1 to be the restriction of ϕ to [0, p] and f2
to be the restriction of ϕ to [p, 1]. Let us write Ṽ (p) ∈ R ∪ {±∞} for the
57
value of the supremum in the problem.
sup
f1:[0,p]→[−∞,0), with f1 increasing














f2(x)q(x) dx ≤ erTC.
We use the value −∞ to indicate that the constraints cannot be satisfied
as is conventional in convex analysis. The supremum of problem (40) and




It is obvious that V (p) = Ṽ (p).
Appendix F Proof of Theorem 5.3
We need first a Lemma.
Lemma F.1. Let A and B be constants satisfying −∞ ≤ A < B ≤ ∞ and
let a and b be finite constants satisfying a < b. We will write I for the set of
increasing functions mapping [a, b] to [A,B].
Suppose that q : [a, b] → R is a positive decreasing function with finite
integral. Suppose that u is a concave increasing function. Let ∂u(x) be the
set
∂u(x) = {y ∈ [0,∞) | ∀x′ ∈ [A,B], u(x′) ≤ u(x) + y(x′ − x)}.
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Apart from at the boundary points {A,B}, this is the subdifferential of the
concave function u4. Let α be a constant and let ϕ? ∈ F satisfy
αq(x) ∈ ∂u(ϕ∗(x)) (41)




























Proof. Let ϕ : [a, b] → [A,B] be another function. By the assumption (41)
we have
u(ϕ(x)) ≤ u(ϕ∗(x)) + αq(x)(ϕ(x)− ϕ∗(x)).
4See Rockafellar (2015) for a discussion of subdifferentials. As remarked in Rockafellar
(2015) the term subdifferential is used for both convex and concave functions even though



















Thus ϕ∗ solves the problem (42). Similarly ϕ∗ solves (43).
Remark. Lemma F.1 can also be used to solve portfolio optimization prob-
lems of the form (7) where the only constraints are bounds on the payoff
function f . These problems are considered in more detail in Föllmer and
Schied (2011), with a greater emphasis on the uniqueness of the solutions.
With the Lemma in place, we can now move to proving Theorem 5.3.
Proof. uR is smooth with derivative
u′R(x) = γR(−x)γR−1.
We define i1(y) = ((uR)








Given α > 0 we define ϕ∗1,α(x) = i1(αq(x)). By Lemma F.1, ϕ
∗











uR(ϕ(x)) dx ≥ L(α, a, b).
(44)
where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 and



























The optimum value of (44) is given by








































which we note is finite and is greater than 0 whenever I1(a, b) is finite.
We compute that
C1(α





















If the investor is difficult to satisfy, it follows that the constraint is binding.
On the other hand if I1(0, p) is infinite, we may take ϕ1(x) = ϕ
∗
α∗(x)1[a,b](x)
to find a function satisfying the constraints of problem (11) with objective
value C(α∗, a, b). Since this tends to −∞ as a→ 0 we deduce that
C1(p) = −∞
if I1(0, p) is infinite. Since uI is increasing we can achieve arbitrary large
utilities below supuI given sufficient cash. Hence the constraint is not binding
in this case.
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To determine when the investor is easily satisfied we solve the optimiza-









We now define ϕ∗2,α = i2(α(q(x)) for α > 0.









ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤ C2(α, a, b).
(46)
where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 and





























γI−1 dx so we have








The corresponding supremum of (46) is then given by


























We deduce that the investor is difficult to satisfy if and only if
I2(a, b)
is finite.
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